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his paper aims to make a comparison between the foreign policy of Kemalist 
Turkey and Fascist Italy by analyzing their bilateral relations between the 
1920s and the early 1930s. Kemalist Turkey certainly shared some of the 
features characterizing the authoritarian regimes which spread throughout 
post-WWI Europe. Italian Fascism had a particularly strong influence on most of those 
nationalist regimes, and among them, also on the Kemalist regime. Fascism and 
Kemalism were both driven by an extreme nationalism. They both shared elements of 
totalitarianism, which is clear in their attempt to shape the entire society and in their 
use of the regime’s party in order to create a monopoly over the activities of the civil 
society. Moreover, they both built a personality cult of the two leaders (Mussolini and 
Atatürk), to an extent not common in other contemporary authoritarian experiences. 
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Despite a period of “warmth” and some similarities between the two regimes, fascist 
Italy and Kemalist Turkey proved to be very different in their approach to 
international relations. Italy showed a very aggressive and revisionist foreign policy, 
whereas Turkey, won the Independence war, tried to build solid and peaceful relations 
with its neighbors. The analysis of Turkish-Italian bilateral relation in the 1920s and 
late 1930s explains the reason of the different behavior which the two countries 
adopted on the eve of and during the Second World War. 
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Nevertheless, differences are more significant than similarities. The two regimes 
structurally differed in their relation with religion and with social classes, in the role of 
the leader and in their ideological attitude toward democracy.1  
Foreign policy is another element of deep difference between these two 
authoritarian experiences. Since the establishment of the two regimes, at the beginning 
of the 1920s, the diplomatic relations between the two countries can be divided into 
three phases: 
- A first period of bitterness dominated by Italian colonial ambitions over south-
western Anatolia (1923-1926); 
- The rapprochement, which followed the consolidation of the Kemalist regime. 
This period is characterized by the attempt made by Italy to build an alliance with 
Greece and Turkey, as a counterweight to French influence in the Balkans (1926-1931); 
- The failure of that project and the return to unfriendly relations between Italy 
and Turkey (1931-1939).  
 This paper argues that the main reason of the failure of the rapprochement 
between fascist Italy and Kemalist Turkey lies in a deeply different understanding of 
the role of those two countries in the international chessboard. Very often conflicts 
among nationalist regimes are based on contested territories or national interests and 
not on ideological contrasts. This paper aims to shows why Italian-Turkish relation in 
the inter-war period does not fit with this assumption. Since Italy renounced its 
ambition over Anatolia, there were the conditions for a stable alliance between those 
two countries. What impeded the development of this alliance was the incompatibility 
of their wider projects. The Kemalist élite was in search of stability, whereas 
Mussolini’s Italy was an element of destabilization for the entire region. Differently 
from the other authoritarian regimes of the time, Turkey’s regime chose to find stability 
in a peaceful way and within the framework of the League of Nations. Differently from 
fascism, the Kemalist state proved to fit within a democratic international system. 
 
1. A hostile beginning 
 
Several elements shaped Italian-Turkish relations in the 1920s and 1930s. As 
independent variables of this relation we can consider three facts which came from the 
history of the two countries as well as from the international contexts. First of all, 
Italy’s traditional expansionist ambitions toward the Balkans and the eastern shore of 
                                                 
1 ZÜRCHER, Erik J., Turkey a Modern History, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 186. 
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the Mediterranean basin. Secondly, Turkey’s seek for security. As third element, we 
must consider the new order which came out of World War I. Italy won the Great War, 
and was one of the great powers – even though the least of them – which were 
supposed to guarantee the post-war order. Turkey was instead a defeated country, it 
lost its empire and large part of its territories and had to fight for its own survival. 
Given these variables, two elements could be added to these picture: the approach on 
international politics of the authoritarian regimes which hold the power in these two 
countries during the inter-war period.  
One of the most important element which shaped Italian politics, after the bloody 
suppression of the worker movement in 1920-21 and the establishment of the fascist 
regime, was the myth of a ‘vittoria mutilata’ (maimed victory). According to the 
nationalist elite, the post-war treaty system did not properly awarded Italy for its war 
effort. So, once Benito Mussolini seized the power in October 1922, Italy started an 
ambiguous policy. On the one hand Rome tried to keep its position as a winning 
powers. On the other hand, Mussolini did not hide his revisionist ambitions, by flirting 
with defeated countries, like Bulgaria, and by establishing positive relations with the 
Soviet Union.  
At the same time, Turkey was fighting a war for its own independence, under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The national movement led by Mustafa Kemal, won the 
country’s independence and renounced to the empire. The new Turkey established 
itself on national borders and did not claim the lost territories, with the exception of 
some bordering contested lands.  
With the treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 1923, the Allied Powers renounced to 
their war-time partition agreements on Turkey and recognized Turkey’s independence, 
leaving the only issue of Mosul to an international arbitrate. By signing the treaty, Italy 
did not really put aside its ambition over south-western Anatolia. The region was 
particularly interesting in Italy’s eyes due to its proximity to the Dodecanese islands, 
the slice of the Aegean archipelago occupied by Italy during the Italian-Turkish war of 
1911-1912. The islands were largely inhabited by Greeks and claimed by Greeks 
nationalists. The main concern of Turkey was their geographical location, which made 
the Dodecaneso an ideal starting point for Italy’s military operations in Anatolia. Aware 
that his country was not in the position to wage a private war against Turkey, Mussolini 
waited for an international crisis which could allow Italy to re-claim the region. 
Diplomatic documents show the level of tension between the two countries in the mid-
1920s. Turkey perceived Italy as a clear threat to its integrity and denounced Italy’s 
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troop gathering near its border.2 The threat never really materialized and Turkey’s 
accusation were probably made in order to alarm the international community. 
Nevertheless, in the summer of 1924, Mussolini asked his Minister of War Antonino Di 
Giorgio to prepare plans for military actions against Turkey.3   
According to Dilek Barlas, who has written the most important works about this 
topic, the key of Italian-Turkish relations in these years lay in the Mosul issue. She 
argues that Italy’s strategy toward Turkey consisted in keeping the tension high and 
waiting for the explosion of a Turkish-British conflict over Mosul, which would have 
brought about the fall of the Kemalist regime.4 Italian diplomatic documents confirm 
this idea, but it seems like the Italian position was more complicated. Rome supported 
London’s stance over Mosul because it hoped to have colonial territorial gain in return 
(on the Libyan-Egyptian border and in Somalia) or to gain south-western Anatolia after 
a hypothetical conflict between Turkey and the British Empire.5 The crisis of Corfu in 
1923 made clear to Mussolini that any military action could only be undertaken in 
accordance with other great powers, or at least with London.6 At the same time, Italy’s 
stance over Mosul can be read with the lenses of a medium-term diplomatic strategy 
toward Turkey. In February 1926, in the midst of the Mosul crisis, Mussolini let Ankara 
know that Italy «does not pursue aggressive designs against Turkey» and that «Turkey 
should shows its confidence in Italy’s policy and Italy will be willing to consider the 
opportunity of agreements».7 In a telegram to his ambassador, Mussolini explicitly 
mentioned the advantages of an Italian ambiguous position:  
 
The friendly policy that the [Italian] National Government has undertaken towards 
Britain, which has assured to Italy full England’s support in international issues 
[…], discourages us in taking a position of overt hostility towards Great Britain, in 
the abovementioned issue. […] Notwithstanding, that does not mean that we could 
overlook […] the importance which Italy places in the consolidation and 
                                                 
2 Documenti diplomatici italiani, Serie 7, Vol. III, 227, p. 138. 
3 Ibidem, 604, p. 364. 
4 BARLAS, Dilek, «Friends Or Foes? Diplomatic Relations Between Italy And Turkey», in 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36, 2004, pp. 235-236. 
5 ARIELLI, Nir, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-40, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010, p. 24; CASSELS, Alan, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1970, p. 303. 
6 In August 1923, After the murdering of Italian diplomats on Greek soil, Mussolini ordered the 
occupation of the island of Corfu as retaliation. The Italians were then forced to evacuate after a 
League of Nations’ resolution, strongly supported by Great Britain. See: CASSELS, Alan, 
Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, cit. pp. 95-126. 
7 Documenti diplomatici italiani, Vol. IV, 236, p. 166. 
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development […] of our many interests in Turkey, therefore it is not convenient to 
declare ourselves overtly against Turkey’s position8 
 
In this document it seems that for Italy a war against Turkey was not the only 
positive possible outcome of the crisis. To Italy’s eyes also a diplomatic solution which 
would keep Mosul in British hands and Turkey humiliated and isolated appeared 
convenient. Mussolini was starting to consider Ankara as a possible strategic partner in 
the Mediterranean. The objections on a Turkish-Italian reconciliation came more from 
the Turkish side, than from the Italian one. The Turkish government was seriously 
concerned about the change in Italy’s foreign policy. During the war of independence, 
pre-fascist Italian government had been the first, among the winning powers, which 
gave up to its claim on a slice of Ottoman empire. But Mussolini bellicose and 
revisionist rhetoric, combined with the Italian presence in the Aegean sea, was 
perceived as a threat by Ankara. 
The second option was the one which actually took place. In 1926, Turkey accepted 
the resolution approved by the League of Nations commission and signed the Frontier 
treaty which assigned Mosul to the British mandate of Iraq.9 This unsatisfying solution 
left Turkey diplomatically isolated and the need to find a way out of this isolation can 
be considered the most important condition for the rapprochement with Italy. But the 
fact which brought the two countries closer was the signature of a Treaty of Friendship 
between France and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,10 in November 1927. 
This pact was perceived as a mortal threat by Italy, which feared a two-front war. 
Belgrade was having with Rome significant contested issues, dating back to the post-
war territorial arrangement of the Adriatic shores. Turkey was as well very 
uncomfortable with the growing role of France in the Balkans, which had already 
signed an alliance with Romania the previous year (June 1926). Moreover, Ankara was 
worried about Yugoslavia’s ambition over Bulgaria, under the banners of pan-Slavism, 
and after that of a possible claim on Constantinople.11 The external pressure posed by 
the French-Yugoslavian treaty, removed the concerns that Turkey used to have on 
Italy’s reliability and drove the new republic to accept Italy as an essential 
counterweigh to the French block.  
                                                 
8 Ibidem, 184, p. 134-135. 
9 According to Andrew Mango, Ankara accepted the final solution on Mosul in order to ‘close’ 
and make for the country easier «to resist the economic demands of the French and the 
Italians». See: MANGO, Andrew,        , Woodstock, Overlook Press, 2000, p. 378. 
10 Later renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
11 In a meeting with the Italian ambassador, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü explicitly 
shows his fear for a possible French support on Yugoslavian ambition over Constantinople. See: 
Documenti diplomatici italiani, Vol. IV, 553, p. 523. 
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2. Rapprochement and treaties  
 
According to fascist Italy’s plan, the idea of a Mediterranean alliance, as alternative 
to the French-sponsored Little Entente, should have included also Greece. The Hellenic 
state had started a policy of reconciliation with both Italy and Turkey, a policy which 
fostered Italy’s hope for a trilateral alliance. Already in 1924, Mussolini talked about 
Italy’s ownership of the Dodecanese islands as «fundamental element of equilibrium in 
the new order of eastern Mediterranean», which could guarantee Turkish-Greek 
peaceful relations.12 Talks for a treaty of friendship between Italy and Turkey started in 
the Spring of 1926, when Turkish foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras confirmed his 
goodwill in this direction.13 Negotiations moved slowly due to the prudence kept by 
Turkey, which was at the same time working on a similar treaty with Greece. The 3rd of 
April 1928 the first high-level meeting took place in Milan. Aras met Dino Grandi, the 
Italian vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and they discussed about the treaty. The Italians 
insisted to sign a treaty which could include also Greece,14 but negotiations between 
Turkey and Greece were proceeding slowly due to unsolved issues dating back to the 
post-war period and the exchange of populations.15 However, in the same days the 
Greek foreign minister was also in Milan, and had separate meetings with both Aras 
and Grandi. During the meeting of Milan, the idea of a reconciliation among the three 
countries – even though through separate agreements – was officially recognized by all 
the components. The 30th of May 1928 Italy and Turkey signed the Treaty of neutrality 
and reconciliation, which assured reciprocal neutrality in case of war against a third 
power. It also forbade the two countries to join alliances directed against one of them.16 
In a speech in the Senate a few days later, Mussolini acknowledged the historical value 
of the Kemalist revolution, by defining Turkey “a nation which is bravely building its 
soul”.17 In September Rome signed a similar treaty with Athens, and two month later 
Grandi was in Ankara, fostering the Turco-Greek conciliation process. In the 
meanwhile, Grandi was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Mussolini. This has 
been seen by historians as a sign of a moderate turn in fascist foreign policy. When, in 
October 1930, Turkey and Greece signed their treaty of friendship, Aras gave a speech 
                                                 
12 Ibidem, Vol. II, 165, p. 103. 
13 Ibidem, Vol. IV, 307, p. 225. 
14 Ibidem, Vol. VI, 216, p. 185-187. 
15 After the Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922), approximately 2 million people moved from one 
country to the other. 
16 «Il testo del trattato italo-turco», in La Stampa, 1 June 1928, p. 1. 
17 MUSSOLINI, Benito, «L’Italia potenza mondiale», in La Stampa, 6 June 1928, p. 1. 
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in front of the Grand National Assembly in which he thanked Mussolini and Grandi for 
Italy’s role in the reconciliation between two old enemies.18 From 1928 to 1932, Italy, 
along with the Soviet Union, was the very pillar of Turkish foreign policy. 
An important part of this friendship was made by naval and arms supply 
agreements which were signed in those years. With the Turkish-Italian naval 
agreement of May 1929, Ankara ordered from Italy two destroyers, three submarines 
and two submarine chasers. For Rome, naval supplies to Turkey was a way to develop 
its still-infant naval industry. At the same time, Mussolini was starting to look at 
Turkey as part of the Italian zone of influence and he thought that providing Ankara 
with an essential navy was a mean “to facilitate Turkish transformation into a pro-
Italian actor in the Eastern Mediterranean naval balance”.19 From Ankara’s point of 
view the building of a navy was an essential – even though very expensive – matter of 
national security, despite the pro-land battle attitude of the entire generation on power. 
In the second half of the 1920s, Turkey had secured its land borders with the Soviet 
Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria, therefore a naval force was the natural completion of its 
defense system. Italy was considered a good supplier because of its relative low 
financial capacity. The Turkish leadership considered this element as particularly 
important because it wanted to avoid the Ottoman experience of dependency on a 
foreign great power. 
This time of “warmth” in Italian-Turkish relations left room for a new interest in 
Turkey for some features of Italian fascism. Many Turkish military and civil servants 
visited Italy for training periods20 and some sectors of the Kemalist elite looked with 
interest to the way fascist “autarchy” helped Italy to react to the economic crisis, in a 
better way than liberal democratic countries.  
 
3. Two different destinies 
 
After 1932, the relations between Italy and Turkey started worsening very quickly. 
In these years, Italy showed its financial inability to be the main supporter of Turkey’s 
economic and military recovery. The visit made by Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü 
in Rome in 1932, was a great political and diplomatic success, but did not reach its aim 
to provide Turkey with Italian financial aids in a stable way. Turkey had to address 
                                                 
18 BARLAS, Dilek, «Friends Or Foes?», cit. p. 243. 
19 BARLAS, Dilek; GÜVENÇ, Serhat, «To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: Italian-
Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929-32», in Middle Eastern Studies 38, 4/2004, p. 143. 
20 Ibidem, p. 154. 
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France in order to obtain the loan it needed and this move deeply upset Italian 
diplomacy.21 Moreover, Italy delated in delivering some of the ships ordered by 
Turkey.22 Despite the rhetoric on autarchy and corporativism, the global economic 
crisis impacted on Italy, and especially on its structural difficulty in providing capitals. 
According to Barlas and Güvenç, “Italians lacked the naval technologies and economic 
resources to foster a patron-client relationship through the arms trade”.23 
These failures significantly affected Italian-Turkish relations, but the main 
divergence started to emerge on the level of international politics. When in September 
1930, French Prime Minister Aristide Briand presented a plan for the establishment of 
a European economic Union within the framework of the League of Nations, the 
reactions of Rome and Ankara were very different. The project addressed only the 
European countries which were members of the League, but the Kemalist regime 
supported the idea along with the application of Turkey for League’s membership. Italy 
perceived Turkey’s membership of the League of Nations has a step toward France and 
its sphere of influence, and so Rome consulted with the Soviet Union, which shared the 
same fear, in order to prevent this possibility.24 In this phase, Rome appeared to be very 
interested in using its relations with Turkey to improve the one it already had with 
Soviet Russia.  
At this time Mussolini was firmly against the League of Nations, and considered it 
as an instrument of Britain and France to foster the status quo, which corresponded 
with their national interests. When in 1932 the council of the League approved Turkey’s 
membership, Italy voted against, and this fact significantly worsened the bilateral 
relations between the two countries. 
The dismissal of Dino Grandi from its post of Italian Foreign Minister in 1932, 
sought a turning point in Italian foreign policy. Grandi’s approach was now seen as too 
soft and anglophile by Mussolini, who was preparing the “spectacular achievement” of 
the Ethiopian adventure.25 The Duce became again the foreign minister of himself26 and 
oriented toward a new policy of expansionism. In December 1932 he mentioned for the 
first time the idea of a cabinet of the superpowers (Italy, Britain, France and Germany) 
                                                 
21 Ibidem, p. 160. 
22 BARLAS, Dilek, «Friends Or Foes?», cit. p. 244. 
23 BARLAS, Dilek, GÜVENÇ, Serhat, «To Build a Navy», cit. p. 158. 
24 Documenti diplomatici italiani, Vol. IX, 190, pp. 269-270. 
25 BURGWYN, H. James, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940, Westport, 
Praeger, 1997, p. 68; POLLARD, John F., The Fascist Experience in Italy, London, Routledge, 
1998, p. 95. 
26 Mussolini kept for himself the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for most of the regime (1922-1929, 
1932-1936, 1943). 
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which should have replaced the League of Nations in dealing with international crises.27 
This speech created apprehension in Turkey, which had just become a member of the 
League.28 Moreover, In March 1934 the Duce made a speech on the future directions of 
Italian expansion, stating that “the historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia 
and Africa”.29 It seems obvious that this new turn in Italian foreign policy could not 
please the Turkish friend, which was in search of stability and security. It must be 
added that the advent to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany, increased Italian self-
confidence in international affairs. 
It must be also noticed that one of the main concerns of Ankara was the peace and 
the status quo in the Balkan peninsula. In this area it was almost impossible to find a 
common stance with Italy. Rome was interested above all in the destabilization of the 
region, and in particular of its main pillar, Yugoslavia, where Mussolini supported 
Croatian and Macedonian separatist movements. The agreement reached by Italy and 
Greece did not develop in an alliance, and the only country with which Rome shared an 
overall vision of Balkan dynamics, was Bulgaria, that is to say the only revisionist 
country of the peninsula. Therefore, Turkey’s interest in Balkan security was completely 
in contradiction with Italian ambitions of territorial acquisitions and regional 
influence. Between the friendship with fascist Italy and Balkan cooperation, Ankara 
chose the latter. In 1934, Turkey signed the Balkan Pact, with Yugoslavia, Greece and 
Romania. The pact had a clear anti-revisionist stance and was directed against 
Bulgarian revanchism and Italian expansionism. The establishment of the so-called 
“Balkan Entente” can be considered the very end of the friendship between the new 
Turkish republic and Mussolini’s Italy.30 
 
4. Conclusion: the impossible friendship 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper has tried to delve into the relationship 
between Italy and Turkey in a span of time straddling the 1920s to the 1930s. In this 
period both the consolidation of the regime built by Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and the 
heyday of Italian fascism took place. The comparison between these two regimes helps 
our understanding of the Kemalist experience because it put Kemalism into its 
                                                 
27 MUSSOLINI, Benito, «A Torino, all’Italia, al Mondo», in La Stampa, 24 October 1932, p. 1. 
See also: BARLAS, Dilek, «Friends Or Foes?», cit. p. 246. 
28 “Documenti,” Vol. XII, No. 509, p. 620 and Vol. XIII, 279, p. 304. 
29 MUSSOLINI, Benito, «Mussolini nel suo possente discorso all’Assemblea quinquennale del 
Regime», in La Stampa, 19 March 1934, p. 1. 
30 See: TURAN, Esin Tüylü, «The Rise of the Concept of a Balkan Pact and the Fist Balkan 
Conference», in History Studies 4, 4/2012, pp. 433-446. 
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historical context. The many similarities between them – nationalism, one-party rule, 
cult of the personality – do not outnumber the differences. Among the latters, foreign 
policy deserves particular importance. Whereas, the ambiguous relationship between 
Kemalism and democracy casts doubts on the harmony between Atatürk’s rhetoric and 
practice, Kemalists’ attitude toward the wider world is much more consistent. After the 
analysis of their relations, Turkish foreign policy appears in stark contrast with 
Mussolini’s projects on south-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean sea.  
Alan Cassels defines fascist Italy’s foreign policy as “consistent only in its 
inconsistency”.31 Expansionism and revisionism were tamed by Mussolini’s realism, 
and by the awareness of Italy’s lack of means to directly challenge the two main powers 
of post-war Europe, Britain and France. Unable to set up a long-term plan to fulfil its 
great ambitions, Rome tried to seized the opportunities of expansion offered by the 
troubled situation of the inter-war Europe. The years of ‘warmth’ in the relationship 
between Italy and Turkey coincide approximately with the phase of moderation of 
Italian foreign policy represented by the period of Dino Grandi as foreign minister. 
According to Martin Bilkhorn the moderation of the Duce’s international policy was 
also driven by the economic crisis, which “suggested Mussolini three years of 
diplomatic calm”.32 
Kemalist Turkey presents a completely different approach to international 
relations. Mustafa Aydın defined it as a continuation of Kemalist internal policy, and as 
based on security concerns: 
 
Kemalist foreign policy was based upon a peaceful orientation in world politics 
expressed by the famous Kemalist dictum “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”. 
Turkey’s survival as a small developing nation at the strategic and exposed location 
astride the straits demanded such a policy.33 
 
In tune with Aydın are Robert Olson and Nuhan Ince, who identify in the building 
up of a “security ring with the neighbouring countries” the main goal of Turkish foreign 
policy.34 Considering this strategic goal, the Kemalist elite took a consistent attitude 
since the National Pact of February 1920. This concern went alongside the 
                                                 
31 CASSELS, Alan, «Was There a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty», in The 
International History Review, 2/1983, p. 262. 
32 BILKHORN, Martin, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, New York, Routledge, 1984, p. 44. 
33 AYDIN, Mustafa, «The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European 
Vocation», in The Review of International Affairs, 3, 2/2003, p. 13. 
34 OLSON, Robert W., INCE, Nuhan, «Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923-1960: Kemalism and 
Its Legacy, a Review and a Critique», in Oriente Moderno 5, 1977, p. 231. 
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apprehension about national independence. The memory of the late Ottoman Empire, 
when foreign powers were able to determine imperial policies, was very clear in the 
mind of the early republican elite. This concern justified Turkey’s reluctance in 
deepening its relations with Italy and explains the prudence used by Turkish foreign 
minister Aras. Turkey did not want to embark in an exclusive relation with a great 
power and to risk a patron-client relation. This is true also in matter of financial aids, 
where the memory of the Ottoman past played a role again. Economic independence 
was viewed by the ruling elite “as indispensable for political and diplomatic 
independence”.35 Turkey served of the Italian friendship for its own scopes. On the one 
hand, the end of its diplomatic isolation which followed the war of independence. By 
approaching Rome, the Turkish government managed to revive other power’s – and 
especially Paris’ – interest in courting Ankara, in order at least to contrast Italy’s 
influence. On the other hand, with the mediation of Rome, Turkey was able to mend its 
relation with Athens, and to turn Greece to an anti-revisionist power with no further 
ambition over Turkish territories.  
Therefore, the reasons which drove to the temporary Italian-Turkish friendship had 
a contingent and not structural nature: 
- The isolation of Turkey after the resolution of the Mosul issue. The lack of 
friendly relations with any western great power was perceived as an element of 
weakness by the ruling elite; 
- Italy’s renounce to colonial ambitions over Anatolia, and the inauguration of a 
‘moderate phase’ of Italian foreign policy; 
- The French-Yugoslavian treaty of November 1927, regarded as a danger for both 
Italy and Turkey, even though for different reason. 
Another reason can be added to this list. The United Kingdom might have played a 
role in Turkish-Italian relations. As Turkish Foreign Minister Aras mentioned in 
diplomatic documents,36 Britain seemed interesting in every move which could balance 
French influence in southeast Europe and the Mediterranean. In many case has been 
underlined Britain’s tolerant attitude toward Mussolini’s foreign policy as a way to 
counterweight an excessive power of Paris. This attitude was particularly common 
among British conservative politicians, and in the case of this paper, in Austern 
Chamberlain, head of the Foreign Office between 1924-1929.37 London’s positive 
approach helped in the involvement of Greece, which had with Britain a long-standing 
                                                 
35 OLSON, Robert W., INCE, Nuhan, «Turkish Foreign Policy», cit., p. 229. 
36 Documenti diplomatici italiani, Vol. IV, 307, p. 225. 
37 BILKHORN, Martin, Mussolini, cit., p. 43. 
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‘special relation’. Nevertheless, even if London was interested in the improvement of 
trilateral relations, the British government never agreed with the establishment of a 
real alliance, and showed it by discouraging Greece to take further steps in that 
direction.38  
As a conclusion, it can be said that the failure of Turkish-Italian relations in the 
inter-war period was not due to contested territorial issues or diverging interests. When 
Mussolini gave the above mentioned speech on Italian expansion directions, he made 
clear – via diplomatic channels – that he did not refer to Turkey. Italian-Turkish 
relations where still high at that time and İnönü had been received in Italy only two 
years before and with the highest honours. Notwithstanding, Turkish press and public 
opinion reacted to Mussolini’s speech with a wave of indignation. This episode helps to 
understand how the difference between the foreign policy of the two countries was 
deep. The failure of this alliance happened because of a structural incompatibility of the 
ways Italy and Turkey perceived their roles in the international context.  
After the war of independence, Kemalist Turkey shaped its foreign policy on the line 
of regional security and multilateralism. By assuming this peaceful attitude, Turkey 
starkly differentiate itself from fascist countries, and made itself compatible with the 
global order shaped by the institution of the United Nations after the Second World 
War. 
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